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LEX INJUSTA NON EST LEX*
DAVID KNOWLES,

Y

OU WILL REMEMBER

O.S.B.; D. Litt.; F.B.A.

that in the final stage of the trial of Sir Thomas

More, when, according to William Roper, Sir Thomas had alleged
that the law of God overrode the laws of England, and that, in addition, the indictment, which relied on the word "maliciously" to bring
More under the statute, was faulty, the Chancellor, Audley, momentarily
shaken by his predecessor's eloquence and known legal wisdom, turned
to his colleague, the Chief Justice, Sir John FitzJames, and asked him
what he thought of the indictment. FitzJames was not to be caught. "My
Lords all, by St. Julian," he replied, "I must needs confess that if the Act
of Parliament be not unlawful, then is the indictment in my conscience
not insufficient." Thus saying, he threw the case back upon the Act of
Supremacy, with the implication that a statute was beyond the reach
of criticism.
As it happens, the latest of all Tudor historians, in a remarkable
survey that appeared only a few months ago, gave it as his opinion that
in the years 1532-34 a great revolution in legal and political theory and
practice was achieved in England: that parliament-that is, of course,
the king in parliament-became then both in theory and practice what it
has ever since remained, the self-sufficient, omnicompetent sovereign
legislative body. That this was so in Joro externo was proclaimed and
understood at the time. The legislative competition of the church, whether
in the form of ancient canon law or new decretals, or in the form of
*The text of a paper read to the St. Thomas More Society of London in December, 1955, by the Regius Professor of Modern History of the University of
Cambridge.
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conciliar decrees in England, had been for
the future, eliminated by Henry VIII. That
it was so in foro interno, that is, that no
appeal was valid to a subject of the king
of England to any alleged law of God or
conviction of conscience, was certainly the
immediate effect of the Henrician legislation, though Henry himself would of
course have stoutly maintained that there
could be no contradiction between his law
and God's. In the course of time, I hope I
am right in saying, a purely secular, positivist view of statute law has prevailed. A
statue is law-we do not consider whether
it is lawful. And yet, illogically enough,
some statutes, such as those requiring an
oath, or imposing military service or dealing with the marriage of divorced persons,
take notice of the existence of divergent
convictions as to what is permitted to a
man to do.
The trial of Sir Thomas More, then, with
all the circumstances preceding it, raises
in an acute form, two problems which,
throughout the history of the western world,
have been debated again and again. What
is law? What is authority? I do not propose
to consider either of these as deep practical
issues - though they certainly are such but rather to glance briefly as a historian at
some of the answers given to them in the
ancient and medieval worlds, and so to arrive at some sort of understanding of the
climate of opinion in the England of Sir
Thomas More's day.
In the two great civilizations of the ancient world, Greek and Roman, bodies of
ancestral written law preceded the great
ages of criticism and were in both cases
regarded with a veneration that was almost
religious in character. You will remember

how Socrates, that great questioner, twice
in his life faced obloquy and violence
rather than depart from legal procedure,
and how, when himself under sentence of
death and offered a collusive escape from
prison, he personified the laws as coming
before him and solemnly pleading with him
not to dishonor them. In Rome you will
also remember how the twelve tables were
regarded as untouchable. Such an attitude
could not long continue in a highly sophisticated and corrupt society. In Greece, the
penetrating thought of Plato and Aristotle,
both of them, in their different ways, convinced that human life should be ordered
by rational principles, and both preoccupied
with care for morality and justice - how
their thought, added to the evolution of a
full democracy, threw every question of
moral and legal sanction into the fire of
criticism. In Rome, the vast growth of an
empire embracing men of many laws, and
the prevailing corruption of society, had an
equally dissolvent influence, though nothing
ever shook the innate Roman pride in their
law.
In the sequel, Roman law won recognition over the greater part of the Empire,
eastern as well as western, and a long series
of eminent jurists, followed by a brilliant
group of codifiers, gave to the corpus of
imperial law a design and a cohesion unattained by any code before or since, and
added to this not only principles of interpretation but definitions of the nature and
end of law in itself. These were made primarily by men influenced by philosophy,
and in particular Stoic philosophy, but this
influence was contaminated, before the age
of Justinian, by the very similar teaching
of the Fathers of the Church. 1?ut very
briefly, we may summarize their outlook by
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saying that the Roman jurists, while eliminating any specifically religious or mystical
conception of law, nevertheless regarded it
as the expression in the ethical sphere of
the common conviction of mankind, as
something as natural to a human being as
are the shapes taken by plants or the instincts of animals. The law, in other words,
was the expression in words of what all
normal human beings agree upon as being
the desirable forms of conduct in human
life. Above and below, so to say, this
central law there were the jus gentium,
the principles of public intercourse recognized by all civilized peoples, and the
customary law which regularized numberless details of daily life in the way found
most suitable in this or that region or race.
Law therefore was not something arbitrary;
it defined conduct in terms of pre-existing
human nature; but it was the result of empirical observation rather than of speculative principles; it gave expression to what
was universally experienced and agreed.
On this view, there might be mistaken
legislation and miscarriage of justice, but
legislation widely accepted or desired was
ex hypothesi an expression of nature. The
Stoic, therefore, had no place in his system
for a clash of obedience. The Christian appeal to the law of God or the dictates
of conscience was irrelevant. Curiously
enough, the Fathers of the Church, especially after the Empire became Christian,
took over the Roman jurists' view almost
in entirety, though substituting the God of
the Bible for nature. I say curiously, because the early Christians, and the latter
scholastics, laid such emphasis upon the
totally new, supernatural demands of the
New Testament. "It was said to you of old.
...
A new commandment ....

As for the other problem, that of authority or sovereignty, we find a twofold stream
of thought. The jurists, at least in theory,
regarded sovereignty as residing in the
people, who had delegated it to the emperor as their representative; the power
therefore behind the law is the will of the
people, and the emperor is their chosen executive. On the other hand, Christian and
oriental influences alike were combining to
make of the Emperor at Constantinople the
representative, almost the vicar, of God.
The original Christian position had been
simple: God- rules all; civil authority is
necessary; such authority therefore represents God. When the Empire became Christian this doctrine, sorely strained but never
abandoned under persecution, became much
more agreeable. It received additional
strength in the eastern half of the Empire
from the adoption by the Emperors of
some of the ceremony and outlook of the
Persian monarchs who claimed some sort of
divinity.
When the barbarian invaders occupied
the western half of the Empire and the
whole region was effectively separated from
the emperor in the east, a totally different
conception of law and authority became
common. In the fragmented Europe of the
dark ages the idea of law as a written code,
based upon reason and justice, and having
coercive power over minds as well as
bodies, disappeared altogether from whole
regions. Law was now equated with custom
and deprived of its rational, speculative
basis. Being custom it was ipso facto accepted without question when formulated,
and when, as especially in England, it was
amplified by the pronouncements of kings
and their counsellors, the wisdom and leadership shown made this seem not very dif-
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ferent from custom. In England, this
mixture of Anglo-Saxon custom and law,
contaminated by a number of purely feudal
technicalities, became the foundation of
common law which was saved from becoming submerged by codified law, whether
civil or canon, largely by the accident of
its development by a body of experts in
close proximity to the courts and without
any connection with the universities.
The first great awakening of Europe in
the eleventh and twelfth centuries was
marked by the great contest of Empire and
papacy and this was modified by, and itself
in turn helped to promote, the development,
which amounted almost to a rediscovery,
of two great ancient bodies of law, the
Roman and the ecclesiastical, henceforward
known as the civil and the canon law. These
two systems were in many ways a contrast.
The one-civil law-was a complete, coherent code covering the whole life of a
great civilization, and in its final form reflecting. great legal principles. On the other
hand, it had been devised for a world-wide,
highly organized, secularized empire; it had
at first sight little relevance to the Europe
of the feudal kingdoms, unorganized, largely
agrarian, primitive and administered by
churchmen. It owed its revival and victories
to two medieval characteristics: the reverence for and desire to imitate the intellectual
achievements of the ancient world; and the
ability to apply and adapt past institutions
and principles to present circumstances,
however different, so long as some connection, even a purely nominal or imaginary
one, could be established. In this case the
connection lay in the name and claim of
the western Emperor and his alleged uhiversal dominion.Canon law was very different. Probably

no body of law was ever more disparate.
Its origins had been occasional and eclectic-decrees of popes, councils and emperors, fragments of the civil code, forgeries
of the ninth century, scripture texts, liturgical directions, all without any order or relation. The resulting amalgam owed its
success almost entirely to its actuality. It
expressed actual procedure and it was controlled by the most powerful and dynamic
institution of the age, the Roman Curia.
Both these systems of law accepted as
axiomatic the pre-existence of unalterable
principles. The civilians took over from the
Roman legists the concept of a law of nature, though they gave a different answer
to the question where this law was to be
found. Some adopted the ancient conception of a quasi-instinctive law completed by
the jus gentium. Others tended to see the
natural law in the main principles affirmed
by the Mosaic law and the New Testament.
But all agreed that the natural law was
immutable; man-made law could reaffirm
it, but not change it.
The canonists were less divided. They
took over the concept of natural law and
the law of nations from the Roman legists,
but they interpreted these as being the
moral principles and conclusions that came
as natural and compelling to all men not
corrupted by sin or false instruction; they
had been reiterated first by Moses and then
by Christ. They were in their main lines
unalterable, though their application might
change and human depravity might demand some modifications.
As regards the source of political authority, the civilians found it solely in the Emperor, to whom it had been delegated by
the people. This of course is simply a repetition of the Code and of the Roman jurists.
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One might have thought -it to have had
little -relevance to twelfth century conditions, when the Emperor's authority was
very limited, and denied or defied by many.
It served, however, as a valuable weapon
with which to fight the Roman Curia, and
gave a new strength to the old imperialist
claim that God had given to the Emperor
supreme dominion over all Christians. This
theory had a great future before it. The
doctrine, recognized early in the thirteenth
century, that the King of France was Emperor in his own dominions was eagerly
appropriated by the new national states,
and we can see its influence in one of the
most celebrated of Thomas Cromwell's
preambles: "Whereas England is and always hath been an empire. .. "
The canonists ultimately had far more
trouble with the question of authority and
never attained complete unanimity. Ultimately, they bifurcated into the extreme
papalists who attributed to the Pope supreme authority, both secular and spiritual,
and those who still clung to some form of
the Gelasian doctrine of the two powers.
This debate, however, is irrelevant to our
present purpose.
To sum up. Both civilians and canonists
were in a sense defenders of an absolutist
government, either imperial or papal. Both,
however, held most strongly that law, however made, must be based upon an ascertainable, immutable law of God, in part
ingrained in human nature, in part affirmed
by God or His representative. The concept
of law as merely the instrument of policy
or the expression of mere convention or
general consent, would have been alien to
all representative thinkers of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries.
Into these two worlds of civilians and

canonists, resting is they did upon the
philosophy and social outlook of Imperial
Rome and the contest of Empire and
papacy, there broke with great suddenness
the purely Greek and severely systematic
thought of Aristotle as seen in particular,
for our purpose, in the complete text of the
Ethics and Politics, which became fully
available only between 1230 and 1265. As
is well known, St. Thomas was the first
great master to adopt the philosophical
teaching of Aristotle not merely here and
there as a useful theory, but as the complete rational basis of his thought. When
St. Thomas came to read the Politics of
Aristotle, made available in Latin in the
translation of his friend William of Moerbeke, circa 1265, a great Christian thinker
was confronted for the first time with the
picture of a Greek city-state in its essentials,
free from all the associations, social and
economic, glorious and romantic, sordid
and tragic, with which it has been clothed
for us, and presented in the cool, sane,
realistic and yet profoundly humane and
genial light that Aristotle never fails to
diffuse.
St. Thomas was profoundly sympathetic
to this picture. He was, as has so often and
so truly been said, the great philosopher of
order. For him, the whole universe of matter and spirit is a vast hierarchy of beings
each fulfilling its own end, and each working in or upon its neighbor; the lower exists
for the sake of the higher, and the higher
cares for the lower. No man is materially
and mentally self-sufficient; he needs the
family and he needs the higher organization
of the city. Once this higher organization
exists it has an end of its own, the common good, which may not always exactly
coincide with the end of the individual and
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the family. It needs laws and government.
So far St. Thomas and Aristotle might
agree.
St. Thomas, however, has more to say
than this. In the first place, the end of human society is not, absolutely speaking, an
end in itself. The end of man is not earthly
happiness, but the knowledge, love and
service of God, and of God as revealed by
Christ. Seconoly, human society, unlike an
animal species, is made up of responsible
individuals each of whom has a direct and
immediate relation to God. From these two
theses follow three conclusions, each of
them as relevant to our own day as they
were to the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. The first is, that no society, not even
a nation or a bloc of nations, has a final
end of its own, as an individual has. Secondly, its end is the common good of all
its citizens, not of itself as a power or a
nation, and it has no end apart from them.
Its rulers must not exploit the citizens; their
business is simply to direct the activities of
the community for the common happiness
here and hereafter. Thirdly, each individual
of the community has an inalienable duty
to God, and an inalienable right to be protected in performing this duty. He cannot,
to use the fine phrase that Burke borrowed
from Shakespeare, barter the immediate
jewel of his soul, nor can he be forced to
abandon it. As for the ruler, one thing at
least is clear; no authority, whether of king
or senate, can be regarded as sovereign in
an absolute or possessive sense. The ruler
is the vicegerent of the community; he is
the persona acting for the corporate whole.
As for authority in its aspect of a moral
force, St. Thomas is neither a democrat nor
a social contractist. The ruler does not derive his authority from the community, but

from the need that rational beings have for
direction in an ordered life, and thus ultimately from God, the Supreme Ruler. On
the other hand, as befits a Dominican and
an Aristotelian, St. Thomas' emphasis is
always on right reason rather than on the
word of command. Men are rational beings
who do right because they are directed to it
by reason expressed in law, not becausespeaking of the purely political planethey are following, the will of a superior
fellow-creature. As Aristotle and Aquinas
repeat, an army exists for its general to use,
but the ruler exists for the sake of the
people he guides.
St. Thomas' doctrine of law has long been
recognized as being, both in form and content, one of the most masterly and pregnant
sections of the Summa, and for all who accept the divine governance and providence
it is the classic expression of the relationship of human law and man's conscience to
the immutable will of God. This is not the
place to expound once more St. Thomas'
divisions of the various kinds of law. But if
we look for a moment at the whole scheme
of law as exposed in the Summa, certain
important conclusions stand out.
The first is, that the sanction and guarantee of all law is the fact that all law is a
fragmentation or, to use Aquinas' own term,
an irradiation of the eternal law which is
divine truth itself.
The second is, that law is the enunciation
of reason; it is therefore itself in the last
resort reasonable and amenable to the
criticism of reason.
The third is, that all law as such is just.
No doubt a particular law may be unjust
in certain circumstances, and therefore in
the judicial forum there is need of equity
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as well as justice, and in the private forum
an individual may neglect the law if he is
prepared to abide by the consequences. But
essentially, the adjective "just" adds nothing to the term law, and St. Thomas does
not hesitate to say: lex injusta non est lex.
The fourth conclusion, therefore, is that
in the last resort, and speaking of human
law only, the individual has the right and
duty to examine a law and, if need be, to
refuse to obey. Often, of course, even if a
law is unjust in particular applications, no
moral issue is involved, and it would be
foolish to refuse obedience; in the colloquial
phrase, it is "just too bad." But in the last
analysis the man of intelligence cannot
plead the law at the bar of conscience.
To us, the Thomist system appears as a
peak, a summit of attainment. We should
expect it to have become, what some of the
older textbooks assume it to have been,
the representative and ruling system of the
middle ages. But in fact medieval Thomism
was only one school of many, and St.
Thomas was soon replaced in the academic
world by thinkets of a very different cast.
There was a great and almost universal
flight from Aristotle, save as a logician, and
the Aristotelians who remained were either
Averroists or secular thinkers such as Marsiglio. In particular, there was a great swing
away from all that seemed like determinism
and that appeared to limit God's freedom.
For St. Thomas the universe is the expression of the design of the wisdom of God;
all law radiates from, and is a participation
in, divine law. Humanly speaking, therefore, God's law is absolute and He Himself
is bound by it since it reflects His nature;
if He willed otherwise He would not be
God. In other words, the will follows the
reason.

Scotus looked rather to the freedom and
love of God. Things are as they are because God loved them and willed them to
be so; His freedom is absolute and His love
immeasurable. As things are, we know from
Scripture that His commands are such and
such, but they could have been different,
and He is not restricted to act thus. Ockham
took this way of argument several stages
further and brought to bear upon it his conception of human knowledge. To put a controversial matter very summarily, Ockham
denied the possibility of any certain knowledge of anything except individuals. There
could be no certain proof of God's existence, or that He was of such and such a
nature. Faith, on the other hand, told us
that God was all-free and all-powerful. We
did indeed know from the Church what God
commanded us to do here and now, but
we could not say that this was absolutely
good or right, still less that God of His
nature must act thus. He might have
ordered us to murder our parents and hate
Him. To Ockham's followers, indeed, what
God was and had commanded was of much
less interest than what He could do if He
would. We are not concerned with the
progress of Ockhamism or Nominalism,
but I do not think it is too much to say
that this way of thought, which captured
almost all the universities of Europe save
in Bohemia and Spain, was one of the most
powerful influences in preparing the way
for the non-rational, fideistic theology, and
the absolutist theories of sovereignty of the
early sixteenth century, which led so easily
to the doctrine of the divine right of kings.
It is true that in England Fortescue used
St. Thomas and his doctrine of a natural
law. But Fortescue resembles the Roman
civilians in failing to use the doctrine as a
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check on authority, and, as a matter of fact
he had very little apparent influence on the
contemporaries of Sir Thomas More. In the
early sixteenth century in England, there
was very little live speculative discipline
among either lawyers or theologians, and
the rare theorists of the fifteen-thirties,
whom Cromwell enlisted as propagandists
of the regime, tended towards a reconstruction of the Empire of the Code or accepted
the political realism and positivist philosophy of a Marsiglio or a Machiavelli. I would
suggest that one of the reasons why the
legislation of Henry and Cromwell had
such an easy passage was that the lawyers,
brought up at the Inns of Court without any
adequate philosophical or theological background, were taken unprepared by the flood
of crucial, controversial statutes fed to them
by government. Whatever may have been
the reason, they did iot realize that government, or rather revolution, by statute
was upon them, and .that whereas in the
courts of common law a judge gave reasons
for his judgment, which might be reversed
in chancery or criticized by a fellow judge,
a statute, devised and operated by a minister such as Cromwell, could in a bland
preamble beg all relevant questions and
rivet a new way of thinking upon the
nation. To Audley or Rich or Paget the
maxim lex injusta non est lex would in any
case have meant nothing-partly, no doubt,
because, like Pilate, they had neither truth
nor justice within themselves, but partly
also because no English lawyer had hitherto
had to face the prospect of statute law con-

flicting with religious truth or moral justice
-and also because, as we have seen, for
two hundred years the conception of law
as the rational expression of divine and
natural ways of behaviour had been lost,
and the independent will of the ruler substituted for it.
St. Thomas, when he wrote his celebrated
phrase, lex injusta non est lex, which in
some ways, like so much of Greek thought,
is a truism, almost a glimpse of the obvious,
probably had no programmatic intention.
In the thirteenth century, almost all lawmakers were churchmen. But in fact the
truth behind his phrase makes a tremen-'
dous assumption and, unlike all the opinions of the civilians and canonists, throws
a tremendous weight of responsibility on
the individual mind and conscience. It assumes that truth and right are objective, and
can be attained by man's reason. No one
but the individual can in the last instance
decide, and he must decide in the ultimate
predicament even if he is alone against the
world. Both More and Fisher stood in that
predicament when they refused the Oath
of Supremacy. It has sometimes been said
that they were standing for the tradition of
European unity or for the rights of conscience. No doubt, by implication, they
were so doing, but it was not for European
unity, nor even for freedom of conscience
as such, that they were standing, but for
the non-entity of a law which traversed a
higher primary law, that the secular power
had no competence to change or to delimit
the nature of Christ's church.

